IT/OT Security: Segmentation, Device Identity and Procurement
An IIoT World article published on 19 November 2026 summarizes talks by experts from Schneider Electric, ABB, Keyfactor, TÜV and Manufacturing ISAC on securing IT/OT convergence without stopping production. It yields a useful checklist for anyone connecting MES, ERP and monitoring systems to machines.
On 19 November 2026, IIoT World published an article on how to secure IT and OT convergence without disrupting operations. The piece summarizes the talks given at the Manufacturing & Supply Chain Day 2025, with speakers from Schneider Electric, ABB, Keyfactor, TÜV and Manufacturing ISAC. It is therefore not a new study and contains no recent data: it is a recap of industry positions, useful as a frame of reference.
The IT/OT boundary is where risk concentrates
According to the figures cited, ransomware attacks on OT environments have grown by roughly 70% a year for four years, and more than half of the attacks that reach OT enter through the IT network. The critical point is the boundary: ERP, historians and CRM tools that collect data from OT create attack paths. Colonial Pipeline and Jaguar Land Rover are cited as cases in which a poorly defined boundary caused serious disruption, even without a breach of the OT network.
On the supplier side, the article reports that in the Canadian mining sector 76% of disclosed breaches involved third-party access. This should be read as data from a single sector, not from manufacturing as a whole.
Why IT tools are not enough
OT prioritizes continuity and safety. Control systems stay in service for 7-8 years before an upgrade, and plant infrastructure for 20-30 years. Multiple vendors coexist, along with unmanaged credentials and obsolete operating systems that cannot be updated. Identity, segmentation and patching therefore require approaches designed specifically for OT.
The measures recommended
Four main lines of action emerge from the talks:
- Segmentation: the starting point for both Schneider Electric (an "OT-first" model with four pillars, with controls ranked by operational consequence) and ABB (a reference architecture adopted at around 400 sites). It must be tailored to vendor, process and sometimes site.
- Device identity with PKI: each device has a unique digital identity, authenticates itself and uses encrypted TLS channels. Access is revoked when the certificate expires or the device is decommissioned, with traceability and no manual password management.
- Third-party remote access: time-limited sessions, scheduled for named individuals and with a defined scope, recorded and monitored in real time, using tools built for OT rather than ordinary IT systems.
- Managed monitoring and testing: Schneider Electric cites validation across more than 180 digital factories and managed monitoring services.
Compliance and procurement
IEC 62443, the Cyber Resilience Act (CRA), NIS2, CMMC and NIST 800-53 are shaping how equipment is purchased. The CRA requires security by design for devices sold in Europe: identity verification, encrypted channels, signed firmware and verified over-the-air updates. The IEC 62443 security levels can serve as a reference in requests for proposal.
Operators are advised to ask for the following in contracts:
- SBOMs (software bills of materials);
- the supplier's vulnerability disclosure policies;
- a clear agreement on who updates the operating system of devices such as HMIs.
Putting it into practice
For those connecting MES, ERP and line monitoring systems to machines, the article works as a checklist: map the flows that cross the IT/OT boundary and segment them, control supplier access, and build IEC 62443 and CRA requirements into tender specifications. One caveat: the final part of the article, a comparison table, was not reviewed in full, and the content dates back to the 2025 event.